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1.	  Introduction	  	  The	   postal	   sector	   has	   undergone	   dramatic	   changes	   over	   the	   recent	   years	   under	   the	  double	   effect	   of	   liberalization	   and	   increased	   competition	   from	   alternative	  communication	   channels	   (e-­‐substitution).	  As	   a	   result,	   the	  mail	   volume	  handled	  by	   the	  historical	   operator	   has	   declined	   sharply	   (Nikali,	   2008;	   Fève	  et	  al.,	   2010;	  Meschi	   et	  al.,	  2010).	   In	   the	   long	   run,	   declining	   volumes	   may	   affect	   both	   the	   extent	   of	   postal	  competition	   in	   the	  market	  and	   the	   sustainability	  of	   the	  universal	  postal	   service	   (Crew	  and	  Kleindorfer,	  2005)	  with	  the	  two	  dimensions	  being	  intrinsically	  linked	  (Gautier	  and	  Wauthy,	  2012).	  	  	  	  	  In	  most	   of	   Europe,	   postal	  markets	   have	   been	   fully	   liberalized	   since	   2010.	   Alternative	  postal	  operators,	  provided	   that	   they	  satisfy	   licensing	   requirements,	   can	  offer	  products	  and	  services	  without	  any	  restriction.	  Newcomers	  in	  the	  postal	  markets	  have	  adopted	  an	  alternative	   business	   model.	   They	   target	   commercial	   mail	   of	   large	   senders	   for	   which	  collection	   and	   sorting	   costs	   are	   limited.	   They	   deliver	   mail	   less	   frequently	   than	   the	  incumbent	  operators	  (usually	  two	  or	  three	  days	  a	  week)	  and	  they	  may	  not	  cover	  all	  the	  national	   territory.	   	   So	   far,	   the	   development	   of	   competition	   is	   unequal	   among	  Member	  States.	   Some	   countries	   (Netherlands,	   Sweden,	   Germany)	   experience	   large-­‐scale	  competition	  from	  alternative	  operators,	  while	  others	  have	  minimal	  competition.	  	  	  	  	  The	  development	  of	  competition—from	  postal	  or	  other	  digital	  operators—is	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	   for	   the	   sustainability	   of	   the	   universal	   service.	   	   There	   are	   two	   reasons	   for	   that.	  Firstly,	   competitors	   target	   mainly	   the	   profitable	   market	   segments,	   leaving	   the	   less	  profitable	   ones	   to	   the	   universal	   service	   provider	   that	  must	   serve	   them	   as	   part	   of	   the	  Universal	   Service	   Obligations	   (USO)	   (a	   phenomenon	   known	   as	   'cherry-­‐picking').	  Secondly,	  there	  are	  important	  economies	  of	  scales	  in	  mail	  delivery.	  	  If	  competition	  from	  postal	   competitors	   or	   electronic	   communication	   erodes	   mail	   volumes,	   the	   average	  delivery	  cost	  increases	  for	  a	  given	  delivery	  frequency.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  question	  of	  entry	   cannot	   be	   totally	   separated	   from	   the	   question	   of	   designing	   and	   financing	   the	  universal	  service.1	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  1	  The	  universal	  service	  and	  its	  financing	  are	  not	  competitively	  neutral	  (Borsenberger	  et	  
al.,	  2010;	  Gautier	  and	  Wauthy,	  2012),	  implying	  that	  a	  change	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  USO	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  competition	  on	  the	  market.	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  Our	  objective	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  model	  of	  competition	  to	  assess	  its	  extent	  in	  a	  context	  of	  declining	  mail	  volumes.	  Our	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  the	  Belgian	  market,	   interesting	  for	   two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  despite	  a	  high	  population	  density,	  postal	  competition	  remains	  limited,	   compared	   for	   instance	   to	  The	  Netherlands,	  with	   currently	   one	   active	   licensed	  small-­‐scale	   operator	   (TBC-­‐POST).Secondly,	   licensing	   requirements	   imposed	   on	   postal	  operators	   are	   strong.	   Licensed	   operators	   have	   the	   obligation	   to	   deliver	   mail	   twice	   a	  week	  on	  80%	  of	  the	  territory.	  More	  precisely	  they	  have	  to	  cover	  80%	  of	  the	  territory	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  regions	  of	  Belgium	  (Flanders,	  Wallonia	  and	  Brussels)	   five	  years	  after	  they	  begin	  to	  operate,	  according	  to	  the	  following	  timeline:	  1st	  year:	  10%,	  2nd	  year:	  20%,	  3rd	  year:	  40%,	  4th	  year:	  60%	  and	  5th	  year	  80%.	  These	  strong	  licensing	  requirements	  may	  deter	  entry.	  	  	  The	  first	  step	   in	  the	  analysis	   is	   to	  assess	  the	  extent	  of	  unconstrained	  entry	  to	  evaluate	  whether	   or	   not	   the	   licensing	   obligations	   act	   as	   a	   constraint.	   In	   a	   second	   step,	  we	   can	  evaluate	   the	   cost	   of	   meeting	   the	   licensing	   obligations.	   If	   this	   cost	   is	   prohibitive,	   the	  coverage	  constraint	  is	  a	  barrier	  to	  entry.	  Last,	  we	  can	  evaluate	  the	  impact	  of	  entry	  on	  the	  sustainability	  of	  the	  universal	  service.2	  	  	  	  To	  that	  end,	  we	  develop	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  model	  of	  postal	  competition.	  The	  cost	  structure	  of	  the	  postal	  operators	   is	  based	  on	  Roy	  (1999)	  and	  the	  competition	  model	   is	  based	  on	  d'Alcantara	  and	  Gautier	  (2008)	  and	  Gautier	  and	  Paolini	  (2011).	  Section	  2	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  cost	  model,	  while	  the	  market	  model	   is	  exposed	   in	  section	  3.	  Simulation	  results	  are	  shown	  in	  section	  4.	  We	  present	   two	  scenarios,	  one	  with	   the	  current	  mail	  volumes,	   the	  other	   where	   volumes	   decline	   by	   40%.	   Section	   5	   analyses	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   licensing	  requirements	  imposed	  in	  Belgium.	  At	  current	  mail	  volumes,	  we	  estimate	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  licensing	   requirements	   is	   moderate	   but	   if	   volumes	   fall	   by	   40%	   this	   cost	   becomes	  prohibitive	  for	  the	  entrant.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  e-­‐substitution,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  room	  for	  profitable	  entry	  unless	  the	  current	  licensing	  requirements	  are	  maintained.	  We	  also	  show	  that	   competition	   and	   e-­‐substitution	   have	   a	   strong	   impact	   on	   the	   incumbent's	   average	  delivery	  cost	  which	  may	  in	  turn	  weaken	  its	  ability	  to	  sustain	  the	  universal	  service.	  	  This	  is	  discussed	  in	  section	  6.	  Finally,	  section	  7	  concludes.	  	  
2.	  Cost	  Model	  	  
2.1	  Cost	  of	  outdoor	  delivery	  work	  	  	  We	  compute	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  outdoor	  delivery	  work	  (ODW)	  following	  the	  approach	  of	  Roy	  (1999),	  which	  is	  based	  on	  Jasinski	  and	  Steggles	  (1977)	  and	  Cohen	  and	  Chu	  (1997).	  The	  delivery	   cost	   is	   broken	   down	   into	   four	   categories:	   travel	   (active	   route),	   stopping,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  To	  maintain	  the	  sustainability	  of	  the	  universal	  service,	  Member	  States	  have	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	   safeguarded	   the	   USO	   financing	   by	   installing	   dedicated	   funding	   for	   the	   USO	  (compensation	  fund	  and/or	  state	  aid)	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  reformed	  the	  USO	  itself.	  	  The	  USO	  reforms	  concern	  all	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  universal	  service:	  the	  product	  bundle	  included	   in	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   USO,	   the	   pricing	   constraints	   applied	   to	   the	   universal	  service	   providers	   (uniform	   pricing,	   special	   rates,	   commercial	   freedom)	   and	   the	  definition	   of	   the	   universal	   service	   itself	   (accessibility	   of	   contact	   points,	   doorstep	  delivery,	  delivery	  frequency).	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delivery	  and	   loading.	  Due	  to	  a	   lack	  of	  available	  data,	   the	  cost	  of	   travel	   to	  and	  from	  the	  delivery	  unit	  to	  the	  route	  is	  ignored.	  	  	  Three	  processes	  j	  may	  be	  used	  for	  delivery:	  foot,	  bike	  or	  car.	  The	  daily	  cost3	  of	  outdoor	  delivery	  work	  on	  a	  given	  area	  i	  using	  process	  j	  is	  given	  by:	  	  𝐶!" = 𝑤𝑇!" + 𝑣!𝐿! 	   (1)	  	  	  where	  w	  is	  the	  hourly	  salary	  of	  the	  carrier,	  Tij	  is	  the	  time	  of	  the	  delivery	  round	  in	  area	  i	  using	  process	  j,	  vj	  is	  the	  vehicle	  cost	  per	  kilometer	  with	  process	  j	  and	  Li	  is	  the	  length	  of	  delivery	  round	  in	  area	  i.	  Note	  that	  vj	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  zero	  when	  the	  delivery	  is	  done	  by	  foot	  or	  by	  bike.	  	  The	  time	  for	  the	  route	  is	  measured	  as:	  𝑇!" =𝑠! 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒!" + 𝑠! 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒! + 𝑄! 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 +!!!!"#$ 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒     (2)	  The	  first	  element	  corresponds	  to	  active	  route	  time,	  that	  is,	  the	  time	  used	  by	  the	  postman	  to	  travel	  in	  the	  delivery	  area	  i	  where	  𝑠! 	  is	  the	  number	  of	  stops	  the	  delivery	  man	  has	  to	  do	  in	   the	  area	  and	   𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒!"   is	   the	  average	   time	  necessary	   to	   travel	   the	  distance	  between	  two	  stops	  in	  this	  area	  using	  process	   j.	  Let	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑!" 	  be	  the	  speed	  of	  vehicle	   j	  on	  area	  i,	  and	  𝐿! ,	  the	  length	  of	  roads	  in	  area	  i,	  we	  have:	  	  	  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒!" = !!/!!!"##$!"	   (3)	  	  	  The	  second	  element	  of	  (2)	  is	  the	  stopping	  time.	  It	  is	  the	  product	  of	  the	  numbers	  of	  stops	  in	   the	   area	  𝑠! 	  and	   the	   time	   spent	   at	   each	   stop	   using	   process	   j	   (entering	   a	   building,	  walking	  up	  a	  path,	  parking	  the	  vehicle,	  etc.).	  	  	  The	  third	  element	  is	  related	  to	  the	  delivery	  (or	  drop):	  delivery	  time	  is	  the	  time	  necessary	  to	  remove	  the	  mail	  from	  the	  bag	  and	  posting	  it	  through	  the	  mailbox.	  While	  it	  may	  not	  be	  exactly	   the	   case	   in	   practice,	   we	   assume,	   following	   Roy	   (1999),	   that	   this	   operation	  generates	   the	   same	  average	   individual	   time	   for	   each	  object.	  Qi	   is	   the	  number	  of	   items	  delivered	  in	  the	  area	  i	  and	  is	  obtained	  by	  multiplying	  the	  number	  of	  items	  delivered	  per	  inhabitant	  per	  day	  q	  by	  the	  population	  of	  the	  area	  popi.	  	  	  	  The	  last	  element	  of	  (2)	  comes	  for	  the	  use	  of	  relay	  boxes	  when	  the	  process	  used	  implies	  capacity	  constraints.	  It	  is	  typically	  the	  case	  for	  deliveries	  by	  foot	  or	  by	  bike.	  𝑞!"#$ 	  is	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  items	  that	  can	  be	  transported	  at	  once	  with	  process	   j,	  and	   loading	  
time	  is	  the	  time	  necessary	  to	  remove	  the	  mail	  from	  the	  relay	  box	  and	  putting	  it	  into	  the	  delivery	  bag.	  	  The	   number	   of	   stops	  𝑠! 	  in	   area	   i	   depends	   on	   the	   number	   of	   delivery	   points	   and	   the	  probability	  of	  distributing	  mails	  at	  a	  given	  delivery	  point	  i.e.	  the	  probability	  of	  making	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Precisely,	  𝐶!"is	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   outdoor	   delivery	  work	   per	   delivery	   day,	   such	   that	   the	  weekly	  cost	  is	  𝐶!"𝑑	  where	  d	  is	  the	  delivery	  frequency	  per	  week.	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stop	  at	  a	  delivery	  point.	  The	  number	  of	  delivery	  points	   is	  measured	  by	   the	  number	  of	  buildings	  𝑛! 	  in	  area	  i.	  The	  probability	  of	  delivering	  a	  mail	  at	  a	  given	  stop	  point	  depends	  on	  the	  grouping	  index	  𝑔! 	  which	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  number	  households	  ℎ! 	  to	  the	  number	  of	  buildings:	  𝑔! = ℎ!/𝑛! 	  (Boldron	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  and	  the	  total	  mail	  volume	  delivered	  in	  the	  area.	   	  We	  follow	  Roy	  (1999)	  and	  we	  model	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  household	  receives	  a	  mail	   item	  as	  a	  Poisson	  process.	   	   If	  at	   least	  one	  household	  in	  a	  building	  receives	  a	  mail,	  then	   the	   delivery	  man	   has	   to	  make	   a	   stop;	  with	   a	   Poisson	   process,	   this	   probability	   is	  given	  by	  𝑒𝑥𝑝 !!!!! 𝑔! 	  and	  it	  increases	  with	  the	  grouping	  index	  and	  the	  total	  mail	  volume.	  	  	  The	  number	  of	  stops	  is	  then	  given	  by:	  	  𝑠! = 𝑛! 1− 𝑒𝑥𝑝 !!!!! 𝑔! 	   (4)	  	  Using	   data	   for	   Belgium,	   we	   calculate	   the	   daily	   cost	  𝐶!" 	  for	   each	   of	   the	   three	   possible	  delivery	   processes.	   Then,	  we	   choose	   the	   process	  with	   the	  minimum	   cost.	   The	   chosen	  process	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  same	  for	  the	  entire	  area	  i	  while	  it	  can	  differ	  from	  one	  area	  to	  the	  other.	  	  Hence	  the	  daily	  cost	  of	  outdoor	  delivery	  work	  on	  a	  given	  area	  i	  is:	  	  𝐶! = 𝑀𝑖𝑛!𝐶!" 	   (5)	  	  	  Using	  this	  cost	  model,	  we	  compute	  the	  daily	  cost	  of	  outdoor	  delivery	  work	  for	  different	  values	  of	  the	  delivered	  items	  per	  inhabitant	  q.	  	  We	  then	  simulate	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  change	  of	  the	  number	  of	   items	  delivered	  each	  day	   in	  the	  area	  Qi	  on	  the	  daily	  cost	  𝐶! .	  Using	  these	  simulated	  costs,	  we	  estimate	  a	  linear	  cost	  function	  for	  the	  outside	  delivery	  work	  in	  area	  
i:	  	  𝐶! = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑄! + 𝛾𝑋! + 𝜖! 	   (6)	  	  where	  𝛼 	  and	  𝛽 	  are	   parameters	   to	   be	   estimated,	  𝛾 	  is	   a	   vector	   of	   parameters	   to	   be	  estimated,	  Xi	   is	  a	  vector	  of	  variables	  representing	  the	  characteristics	  of	  area	   i	   (density,	  length	  of	  roads,	  number	  of	  households,	  number	  of	  buildings,	  etc.)	  and	  𝜀! 	  is	  an	  error	  term.	  The	  estimated	  coefficient	  𝛽	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  mail.	  	  
2.2	  Data	  	  There	   are	   no	   publicly	   available	   data	   on	   postal	   routes.	   We	   therefore	   use,	   as	   a	   first	  approximation,	   data	   on	   Belgian	  municipalities	   as	   the	   reference	   point	   for	   defining	   the	  delivery	  areas	   i.	  Belgium	  is	  divided	   into	  589	  municipalities	  ranging	  from	  1	  km2	  to	  214	  km2.	  Most	  municipalities	  (88%)	  have	  a	  density	  lower	  than	  1000	  inhabitants	  per	  km2	  but	  some	  are	  densely	  populated	  (up	  to	  22048	  inhabitants	  per	  km2).	  For	  each	  municipality,	  we	   collected	   administrative	   demographic	   and	   geographic	   data	   from	   several	   public	  services	  websites.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  and	  sources	  are	  given	  in	  Table	  1.	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Table	  1:	  Descriptive	  statistics	  
Variable	   	   mean	   s.d.	   Source	  Density	  (inhabitants/km2)	   	   727	   (1957.44)	   SPF	  Economiea	  Population	  (inhabitants)	   popi	   18257	   (29021.9)	   SPF	  Economiea	  Length	  of	  roads	  (km)	  	   Li	   198.1	   (143.53)	   SPF	  Mobilitéb	  Number	  of	  households	  	   hi	   7832	   (13791.2)	   SPF	  Economiea	  Number	  of	  buildings	   ni	   -­‐6049.6	   (7734.51)	   Statbela	  Grouping	  index	  	   gi	   1.19	   (0.445)	   gi=	  hi/ni	  Number	  of	  stops	  	   si	   5577.2	   (7329.43)	   Equation	  (4)	  Number	  of	  observations:	  589.	  a	  Data	  2009	  b	  Data	  2013	  	  In	  order	  to	  calibrate	  the	  cost	  model,	  we	  formulate	  a	  number	  of	  hypotheses	  (see	  Table	  2	  in	  the	  appendix).	  	  	  
2.3	  Cost	  estimation	  	  Equation	  (5)	  is	  calibrated	  for	  the	  589	  Belgian	  municipalities	  using	  data	  and	  hypotheses	  presented	   in	  Tables	  1	  and	  2.	  For	   the	  annual	  number	  of	   items	  per	   capita	  x,	  we	  use	   the	  figures	  provided	  by	  WIK	  (2013)	  for	  the	  year	  2011:	  233	  items	  per	  capita.	  We	  divided	  it	  by	  5	  working	  days	  and	  52	  weeks	  to	  obtain	  the	  number	  of	  items	  delivered	  by	  inhabitant	  per	  day	  (0.9)	  that	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  same	  in	  all	  areas.	  	  	  Figure	   1	   shows	   the	   results	   for	   the	   unit	   cost	   ( 𝐶!/𝑄! )	   per	   municipality,	   where	  municipalities	  are	  presented	  from	  the	  most	  to	  the	  least	  densely	  populated.	  Average	  unit	  cost	   of	   outdoor	  delivery	  work	   is	   0.147€	  per	   item.	   From	  Figure	  1,	  we	   can	   see	   that	   the	  country	   is	   somewhat	   homogenous	   with	   few	   very	   densely	   or	   sparely	   populated	  municipalities.	  Indeed,	  the	  average	  delivery	  cost	  per	  quintile	  is	  almost	  identical	  for	  Q2,	  Q3	  and	  Q4	  (=0.157,	  0.164	  and	  0.174),	  while	  it	  is	  substantially	  lower	  for	  Q1	  (0.118)	  and	  higher	   for	  Q5	  (0.235).	  Given	   that	  municipalities	  have	  similar	  costs	   in	   the	   three	  middle	  quintiles,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  entrant	  will	  either	  cover	  all	  or	  none	  of	  them	  (d'Alcantara	  and	  Gautier,	  2008).	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Figure	  1:	  Unit	  cost	  of	  outdoor	  delivery	  work	  	  
	  	  We	  then	  calibrate	  this	  equation	  (5)	  for	  the	  589	  Belgian	  municipalities	  allowing	  changes	  in	  the	  number	  of	  items	  delivered	  by	  inhabitant,	  using	  x	  =	  {100,	  233,	  400}.	  	  This	  provides	  us	  with	  1767	  observations	  from	  which	  we	  can	  estimate	  equation	  (6).	  Table	  3	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  the	  estimation.	  	  	   Table	  3:	  OLS	  estimation:	  daily	  cost	  of	  outdoor	  delivery	  work	  	  
	   Coefficient	   SE	  Items	  delivered	  in	  the	  area	  (Qi)	   0.0467***	   (0.0004)	  Length	  of	  roads	  (li)	   2.3048***	   (0.0617)	  Number	  of	  buildings	  (ni)	   0.1580***	   (0.0026)	  Number	  of	  households	  (hi)	   0.0139***	   (0.0017)	  Density	   -­‐0.0364***	   (0.0040)	  Constant	   44.5569***	   (12.8923)	  N	   1767	   	  R2	   0.992	   	  ***	  Significant	  at	  1%	  level.	  	  	  This	   estimation	   strategy	   allows	   us	   to	   disentangle	   the	   delivery	   cost	   in	   area	   i	   into	   (i)	   a	  marginal	  cost	  of	  outdoor	  delivery	  per	  item	  and	  (ii)	  a	  fixed	  cost	  of	  delivery	  in	  area	  i	  that	  can	  be	  reconstructed	  using	  the	  characteristics	  of	  area	   i	  and	  the	  coefficients	  of	  Table	  3.	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The	  marginal	   cost	   is	   estimated	   at	   0.0467€	  per	   item.	   The	   drivers	   of	   the	   delivery	   costs	  have	   the	   expected	   sign.	   The	   cost	   decreases	   with	   the	   density	   and	   increases	   with	   the	  length	  of	  roads,	  the	  number	  of	  buildings	  and	  households.	  	  	  
3.	  Market	  analysis	  	  
3.1	  The	  market	  game	  	  As	   a	   next	   step,	   we	   use	   the	   simulated	   cost	   model	   to	   construct	   market	   scenarios.	   We	  consider	   two	   scenarios	  where	   an	   entrant	   (E)	   competes	  with	   the	   incumbent	   (I)	   on	   the	  bulk	  mail	  market.	   In	   our	  market	   simulations,	   we	   consider	   that	   the	   entrant	   is	   equally	  efficient	   as	   the	   incumbent.	   In	   particular,	   we	   consider	   that	   the	   two	   operators	   use	   the	  same	  delivery	  cost	  technology	  represented	  by	  our	  simulated	  cost	  model.	  	  	  Even	  if	  the	  two	  operators	  use	  the	  same	  technology,	  they	  have	  different	  business	  models.	  The	   incumbent,	  which	   is	  considered	  to	  be	   the	  universal	  service	  provider,	  must	  deliver	  standard	  and	  bulk	  mails	  five	  days	  a	  week.	  The	  entrant	  has	  a	  business	  model	  that	  differs	  in	  three	  respects	  from	  the	  incumbent's	  one.	  First,	  the	  entrant	  concentrates	  its	  operation	  on	  the	  bulk	  mail	  market	  where	  sorting	  and	  collecting	  costs	  are	   lower.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  incumbent	  remains	  the	  unique	  provider	  of	  traditional	  mail.	  Second,	  the	  entrant	  has	  a	  lower	  delivery	   frequency	   (d)	   of	   2	   days	   a	  week.	   	   Last,	   the	   entrant	   is	   not	   committed	   to	  cover	  the	  whole	  territory	  and	  it	  may	  covers	  only	  the	  areas	  i	  where	  it	  is	  profitable.	  	  	  To	  model	   competition	   on	   the	   bulk	  mail	  market,	  we	   assume	  demand	   functions	   for	   the	  incumbent	   and	   the	   entrant,	   derived	   from	   the	   maximization	   of	   the	   utility	   of	   a	  representative	  sender	  defined	  as:	  	  𝑈 𝑥! , 𝑥! = 𝛼!𝑥! + 𝛼!𝑥! − 𝛽 !!!! − 𝛽 !!!! − 𝛿𝑥!𝑥! 	  	  	  (7)	  where	  xI	  and	  xE	  are	  the	  number	  of	  (bulk)	  items	  sent	  with	  the	  incumbent	  and	  the	  entrant,	  respectively.	  The	  asymmetry	  in	  business	  models	  is	  reflected	  by	  the	  difference	  between	  
αI	  and	  αE.	  All	  else	  equal	  the	  representative	  sender	  is	  willing	  to	  pay	  an	  extra	  αI	  –	  αE,	  for	  the	   use	   of	   the	   incumbent’s	   service..	  4	  Demand	   levels	   xI	   and	   xE	   are	   expressed	   as	   mail	  received	  per	   inhabitant	   per	   year.	   From	  Equation	   (7)	  we	   can	  derive	  demand	   functions	  corresponding	   to	   a	   competitive	   situation	   (if	   area	   i	   is	   covered	   by	   both	   I	   and	   E)	   and	   a	  monopolistic	  situation	  (if	  area	  i	  is	  only	  covered	  by	  I).	  	  	  	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  game	  is	  the	  following.	  The	  incumbent	  first	  sets	  its	  price	  for	  bulk	  and	  standard	  mails.	   Then	   the	   entrant	   decides	   on	   its	   price	   and	   on	   its	   area	   coverage.	  With	  sequential	  price	  choices,	   there	   is	  no	  strategic	   limitation	  of	   the	  coverage	   (Valletti	  et	  al.,	  2002)	  and	  the	  price	  equilibrium	  always	  exists	  (Gautier	  and	  Wauthy,	  2010).	  	  Given	  prices	  
(pI,	  pE),	  the	  mail	  volume	  captured	  by	  the	  entrant	  is	  equal	  to	  xE(pI,	  pE)	  per	  inhabitant.	  	  The	  entrant's	  coverage	  will	  consist	  of	  all	  the	  areas	  i	  where	  operations	  are	  profitable,	  that	  is	  all	  areas	  i	  satisfying:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  estimate	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  different	  service	  attributes,	  Rohr	  et	  
al.	   (2013)	  found	  that,	   for	  business	  clients	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  difference	  between	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  next-­‐day	  delivery	  service	  compared	  to	  a	  delivery	  within	  2	  or	  3	  days.	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𝜋!" = 𝑝! − 𝑐! 𝑥!𝑝𝑜𝑝! − 52𝑑𝐶!(𝑄!") ≥ 0,	  	  where	  𝑄!" = !!!"!!!"! 	  	   is	   the	   number	   of	   items	   delivered	   by	   the	   entrant	   on	   area	   i	   per	  delivery	  day	  and	  cu	  the	  upstream	  cost	  of	  mails	  (collection,	  transport,	  sorting…).	  	  	  	  
3.2	  Calibration	  of	  the	  model	  	  	  To	   calibrate	   these	   demand	   functions,	   our	   starting	   point	   is	   a	   reference	   monopoly	  scenario	   in	   which	   the	   incumbent	   operator	   is	   the	   unique	   postal	   operator.	   In	   this	  monopolistic	   case,	   the	   price	   of	   bulk	  mail	   is	   pI	  =	   0.5€	   and	   at	   this	   price,	   the	   bulk	  mail	  volume	  is	  equal	  to	  200	  items	  per	  inhabitant	  per	  year.	  The	  price	  of	  the	  standard	  mail	  is	  0.72€	  and,	  at	  this	  price,	  the	  mail	  volume	  is	  equal	  to	  33	  mail	  per	  inhabitant	  per	  year.	  The	  prices	   used	   are	   representative	   of	   the	   ones	   currently	   observed	   in	   Belgium	   and	   the	  repartition	   between	   B2X	   and	   C2X	   mailed	   items	   roughly	   corresponds	   to	   the	   figures	  provided	  by	  Copenhagen	  Economics	  (2010):	  88%	  for	  B2X	  and	  12%	  for	  C2X	  	  We	  then	  consider	  that	  the	  entrant	  would	  capture	  10%	  of	  the	  market	  for	  bulk	  mail	   if	   it	  applies	  the	  same	  price	  as	  the	  incumbent.	  It	  would	  capture	  50%	  of	  the	  market	  if	  it	  offers	  a	  20%	  discount	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  incumbent's	  price.	  We	  suppose	  a	  direct	  price	  elasticity	  of	   -­‐0.4	   and	   a	   displacement	   ratio	   of	   0.9.	   This	   last	   ratio	   is	  𝜎 = −(𝑑𝑥! 𝑑𝑝!) (𝑑𝑥! 𝑑𝑝!)	  	  and	   indicates	   that	   90%	   of	   the	   items	   sent	   by	   the	   entrant	   are	   captured	   from	   the	  incumbent.	  These	  parameters	  are	   similar	   to	   the	  ones	  used	  by	  De	  Donder	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  and	  d'Alcantara	  and	  Gautier	  (2008).	  	  	  	  The	  demand	  functions	  addressed	  to	  the	  two	  firms	  are	  not	  totally	  symmetric	  as,	  at	  equal	  prices,	   the	   incumbent	   keeps	   a	   higher	   market	   share	   than	   the	   entrant.	   To	   have	   equal	  market	   shares,	   the	   entrant	   should	   offer	   a	   20%	   discount.	   	   This	   specification	   aims	   at	  reflecting	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  two	  firms	  have	  a	  different	  business	  model,	  in	  particular	  their	  coverage	   and	   delivery	   frequency	   differ.	   For	   that	   reason,	   even	   if	   the	   entrant	   offers	   a	  better	   rate	   than	   the	   incumbent,	   all	   the	   consumers	   do	   not	   immediately	   switch	   to	   the	  entrant.	  In	  our	  simulation	  the	  cross	  price	  elasticity,	  evaluated	  at	  pI=pE=0.5€	  is	  equal	  to	  0.72.	   This	   cross-­‐price	   elasticity	   is	   in	   our	   specification	   of	   the	   demand	   function	  independent	   of	   the	   entrant’s	   coverage,	  which	   is	   of	   course	   a	   restriction	  of	   the	  demand	  model.	  	  	  	  The	  upstream	  cost	  cu	  is	  set	  to	  0.20€	  for	  bulk	  mail	  and	  0.25€	  for	  standard	  mail,	  both	  for	  the	   incumbent	   and	   the	   entrant.	   	  Other	   costs	   (e.g.	   post	   offices)	   are	  not	   included	   in	  our	  modeling.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  we	  will	  focus	  mainly	  in	  the	  change	  in	  the	  incumbent's	  profit	  after	  entry	  and	  the	  absolute	  value	  for	  the	  profit	  should	  be	  interpreted	  with	  caution	  as	  it	  does	  not	  include	  omitted	  cost.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.	  Simulation	  results	  	  	  We	   consider	   two	   scenarios.	   In	   the	   first,	   the	  demands	  are	   calibrated	   to	   corresponds	   to	  actual	  mail	  volumes	  (200	  bulk	  items	  at	  a	  price	  pI=0.5	  for	  a	  monopolistic	  incumbent)	  and	  the	   entrant	   delivers	   mails	   	   twice	   a	   week	   on	   part	   of	   the	   territory.	   In	   this	   scenario,	   a	  hypothetical	  monopolistic	  incumbent	  realizes	  a	  profit	  equal	  to	  459.05	  millions	  €	  and	  it	  has	  an	  average	   cost	  of	  ODW	  equal	   to	  0.141€.	   In	   the	   second	  scenario,	   the	  mail	   volume	  declines	  by	  40%	  compared	  to	  the	  current	  level.	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4.1	  Market	  simulations:	  current	  mail	  volume	  	  	  The	  results	   for	  the	  current	  mail	  volume	  scenario	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  4.	   	   In	  the	  first	  column,	   we	   report	   the	   results	   assuming	   that	   the	   incumbent	   continues	   to	   charge	   the	  current	  monopoly	  price	  after	  entry;	  in	  the	  second	  column,	  the	  incumbent	  sets	  the	  profit	  maximizing	   prices.	   	   For	   each	   simulation,	   we	   report	   prices,	   volumes,	   coverage	   by	   the	  entrant,	  profits	  and	  the	  average	  costs	  of	  the	  ODW.	  	  	  	  	   Table	  4:	  Market	  simulations,	  current	  mail	  volume	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  first	  thing	  that	  should	  be	  noticed	  is	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  entrant’s	  territorial	  coverage.	  At	   current	   prices,	   the	   entrant	  would	   cover	   84%	   of	   the	  municipalities	   and	   66%	   if	   the	  incumbent	   sets	   the	   profit-­‐maximizing	   price	   assuming	   entry	   will	   occur.	   	   The	  homogeneous	   nature	   of	   the	   country	   with	   a	   lot	   of	   municipalities	   with	   similar	   cost	  conditions	  explains	  the	  importance	  of	  entry.	  	  	  	  After	  entry,	  the	  incumbent	  optimally	  decreases	  its	  price	  by	  10%,	  with	  its	  corresponding	  market	  share	  for	  the	  bulk	  mail	  being	  equal	  to	  65%.	  This	  large	  market	  share	  is	  explained	  




Incumbent	  Incumbent’s	  price	  (pI)	   0.5	   0.45	  Entrant’s	  price	  (pE)	  	   0.4	   0.383	  Municipalities	  covered	  (%)	   	  84.38%	   65.87%	  Bulk	  volume	  for	  Incumbent	  (xI)	   105	   131	  Bulk	  volume	  for	  Entrant	  (xE)	   105	   86	  Incumbent’s	  average	  cost	  of	  ODW	  (€)	   	  0.200	   0.173	  Entrant’s	  average	  cost	  of	  ODW	  (€)	   	  0.125	   0.137	  Incumbent’s	  profit	  (106	  €)	   	  212.80	   220.70	  Entrant’s	  profit	  (106	  €)	   	  81.10	   36.95	  Territory	  covered	  (%)	  (Belgium)	   	  73.41%	   54.17%	  Territory	  covered	  (%)	  (Brussels)	   100%	   100%	  Territory	  covered	  (%)	  (Flanders)	   	  95.48%	   83.34%	  Territory	  covered	  (%)	  (Wallonia)	   	  52.67%	   26.64%	  Cost	  of	  licensing	  conditions	  (106	  €)	   1.02	   2.81	  
Cost	  of	  licensing	  conditions	  (%	  of	  πE)	   1.25%	   7.60%	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by	  the	  facts	  that,	   in	  the	  municipalities	  where	  both	  firms	  deliver,	  the	  incumbent	  market	  share	  remains	  substantial	  (60%)	  and	  the	  incumbent	   is	  the	  only	  firm	  delivering	  mail	   in	  the	  non-­‐covered	  municipalities.	  	  	  	  	  Entry	  has	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  incumbent's	  profit.	  Compared	  to	  the	  monopolistic	  situation,	   the	   profit	   declines	   by	   approximately	   52%.	  This	   sharp	  decrease	   in	   the	   profit	  results	   from	  both	   the	  business-­‐stealing	  effect	  of	   entry	  and	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  average	  cost	  of	  delivery	  due	  to	  lost	  scale	  economies.	  The	  incumbent's	  average	  cost	  of	  ODW	  cost	  increases	   from	   0.141	   in	   the	   monopoly	   situation	   to	   0.173€.	   Due	   to	   its	   lower	   delivery	  frequency	   and	   its	   selective	   entry	   in	   the	   least	   costly	   areas,	   the	   entrant	   has	   a	   lower	  average	   cost	   of	   ODW	   than	   the	   incumbent.	   For	   this	   reason,	   our	   simulations	   show	   that	  there	   is	   room	   for	   profitable	   entry	   and	   that	   a	   profit-­‐maximizing	   entrant	   will	   limit	   its	  	  territorial	  coverage,	  with	  only	  65%	  of	  the	  municipalities	  covered	  mainly	  in	  Brussels	  and	  in	  Flanders.	  	  	  
4.2	  Market	  simulation:	  declining	  mail	  volume	  	  In	   the	   second	   scenario,	   we	   consider	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	   mail	   volume	   compared	   to	   the	  current	   situation.	  More	   in	  particular,	  we	   suppose	   that	   at	   the	   current	   incumbent	  price,	  both	  the	  bulk	  and	  the	  standard	  mail	  volume	  drop	  by	  40%.	  	  This	  decrease	  in	  volume	  is	  in	  our	  view	  a	  reasonable	  scenario	  to	  capture	  the	  long-­‐term	  impact	  of	  e-­‐substitution.	  Except	  for	  this	  volume	  change,	  the	  other	  parameters	  used	  to	  calibrate	  the	  demand	  functions	  are	  similar.	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Table	  5:	  Market	  simulations,	  declining	  mail	  volume	  




Incumbent	  Incumbent’s	  price	  (pI)	   0.5	   0.45	  Entrant’s	  price	  (pE)	  	   0.4	   0.383	  Municipalities	  covered	  (%)	   43.97%	   7.47%	  Bulk	  volume	  for	  Incumbent	  (xI)	   63	   79	  Bulk	  volume	  for	  Entrant	  (xE)	   63	   51	  Incumbent’s	  average	  cost	  of	  ODW	  (€)	   0.267	   0.214	  Entrant’s	  average	  cost	  of	  ODW	  (€)	   0.160	   0.131	  Incumbent’s	  profit	  (106	  €)	   71.32	   97.46	  Entrant’s	  profit	  (106	  €)	   19.34	   5.75	  Territory	  covered	  (%)	  (Belgium)	   33.73%	   3.51%	  Territory	  covered	  (%)	  (Brussels)	   100%	   100%	  Territory	  covered	  (%)(Flanders)	   51.97%	   5.16%	  Territory	  covered	  (%)(Wallonia)	  	   16.14%	   0.99%	  Cost	  of	  licensing	  conditions	  (106	  €)	   5.72	   19.64	  Cost	  of	  licensing	  conditions	  (%	  of	  πE)	   29.59%	   341.66%	  
Note:	   Incumbent's	  price	  in	  the	  monopoly	  case	  is	  0.5	  for	  bulk	  mail	  and	  0.72	  for	  standard	  mail;	  volume	  (number	  of	  items	  delivered	  per	  capita	  per	  year	  in	  the	  monopoly	  case)	  is	  120	  for	  bulk	  mail	  and	  20	  for	  standard	  mail;	  upstream	  cost	  is	  0.20	  for	  bulk	  mail	  and	  0.25	  for	  standard	  mail;	  price	  elasticity	  is	  -­‐0.4;	  displacement	  ratio	  is	  0.9;	  the	  number	  of	  deliveries	  per	  week	  (d)	  is	  5	  for	  the	  incumbent	  and	  2	  for	  the	  entrant.	  	  With	   declining	   mail	   volumes,	   the	   coverage	   of	   the	   entrant	   falls	   drastically:	   it	   is	   only	  profitable	   to	   cover	   7.5%	   of	   the	   municipalities.	   Notice	   also	   that,	   despite	   a	   limited	  coverage,	  market	  competition	  remains	  intense	  as	  the	  price	  charged	  by	  the	  incumbent	  is	  similar	   to	   the	   above	   case.	   The	   reason	   is	   the	   homogenous	   nature	   of	   the	   country.	   At	   a	  higher	  price,	   the	  entrant	  would	  have	  a	  much	   larger	  coverage,	  as	   it	   is	   illustrated	  by	  the	  passive	   incumbent	   case	   in	   the	   first	   column	   of	   Table	   5:	   without	   a	   price	   reaction,	   the	  entrant	  would	  cover	  more	  than	  40%	  of	  the	  municipalities.	  The	  optimal	  price	  set	  by	  the	  incumbent	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  limit	  price	  that	  prevents	  larger	  scale	  entry	  by	  the	  challenger.	  	  Thus,	  even	  if	  the	  incumbent’s	  market	  share	  remains	  important	  (91%),	  the	  market	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  very	  competitive.	  The	  incumbent	  profit	  falls	  drastically	  (-­‐55%	  compared	  to	   the	   first	   scenario)	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  decline	   in	  mail	   volume	  and	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  average	  cost	  of	  ODW.	  With	  declining	  mail	  volume,	  there	  is	  still	  room	  for	  profitable	  entry	  but	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  scale	  than	  at	  the	  current	  mail	  volume.	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5.	  Licensing	  requirements	  	  Belgium	   has	   quite	   unusual	   and	   substantive	   licensing	   obligations	   including,	   (i)	   the	  obligation	   to	   deliver	  mails	   twice	   a	   week	   after	   two	   years	   of	   operations,	   (ii)	   territorial	  coverage	   constraints	   with	   the	   obligation	   to	   cover	   80%	   of	   the	   territory	   in	   all	   three	  regions	  after	  5	  years	  of	  operations	  and	  (iii)	  the	  use	  of	  a	  uniform	  tariff.	  Currently,	  there	  is	  only	  one	   licensed	  operator	  who	  started	   its	  operation	   in	  May	  2013	  and	   it	  has	  a	   limited	  market	   share	   (~1%).	   Belgium	   strong	   licensing	   obligations	   have	   been	   criticized.	   The	  European	  Commission	  started	  an	  infringement	  procedure	  against	  Belgium	  for	  imposing	  licensing	  conditions	  that	  are	  non-­‐necessary	  and	  not	  justified.	  A	  recent	  WIK	  report	  (WIK,	  2015)	   considers	   the	   licensing	   conditions	   to	   be	   a	   barrier	   to	   entry	   and	   suggested	   to	  remove	   them.	  Following	   these	   critics,	   the	  Belgian	  postal	   law	   is	   expected	   to	  be	   revised	  soon,	  particularly	  on	  this	  point.	  	  	  	  Using	   our	  market	   scenarios,	  we	   can	   evaluate	  whether	   the	   entrant	  meets	   the	   licensing	  requirements	   and,	   if	   not,	   the	   cost	   of	  matching	   them.	   In	  Tables	  4	   and	  5,	  we	   report	   the	  coverage	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  the	  percentage	  of	  municipalities	  covered	  and	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  territory	  covered,	  this	  last	  number	  being	  split	  by	  region.	  Coverage	  constraints	  in	  the	   licensing	  obligations	  are	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  percentage	  of	  the	  territory	  with	  the	  80%	  threshold	  to	  be	  reach	  after	  5	  years	  in	  all	  the	  three	  regions.	  	  	  If	  the	  entrant	  fails	  to	  meet	  this	  coverage	  constraint	  (which	  is	  the	  case),	  we	  evaluate	  the	  cost	  of	  meeting	  the	  licensing	  conditions,	  using	  the	  following	  algorithm:	  the	  entrant	  has	  to	   cover	   loss-­‐making	  municipalities	   till	   it	   reaches	   the	   80%	   coverage	   constraint	   in	   the	  three	   regions	   and	   it	   will	   cover	   firstly	   the	   municipalities	   where	   the	   losses	   are	   the	  smallest.5	  The	  cost	  of	  the	  licensing	  obligations	  is	  then	  evaluated	  as	  the	  lost	  profit	  on	  the	  municipalities	  that	  the	  entrant	  is	  constrained	  to	  serve.	  If,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  entrant’s	  profit	  becomes	   negative,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   enter	   profitably	   the	   market	   and	  to	   meet	   the	  licensing	  constraints.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  license	  is	  a	  barrier	  to	  entry.	  	  	  	  	  	  At	   current	   mail	   volumes,	   the	   coverage	   of	   the	   Walloon	   region	   (the	   less	   densely	  populated)	  is	  only	  26%,	  far	  below	  the	  80%	  obligations	  while	  the	  threshold	  is	  reached	  in	  the	   other	   two	   regions.	   Increasing	   coverage	   in	   Wallonia	   costs	   2.81	   million	   €	   to	   the	  entrant,	  representing	  7.6%	  of	  its	  profit.	  Though	  substantial	  it	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  barrier	   to	   entry.	   Things	   are	   radically	   different	   if	   volumes	   decline.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  coverage	  constraint	  is	  not	  satisfied	  in	  Flanders	  (5%)	  and	  in	  Wallonia	  (1%).	  We	  estimate	  the	  cost	  of	  reaching	  the	  80%	  threshold	  to	  19.64	  million	  €.	  This	  amount	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  unconstrained	  profit,	  which	  means	  that	  with	  declining	  volumes,	  the	  license	  constitutes	  a	  barrier	   to	   entry.	  We	   therefore	   conclude	   that	   a	   decrease	   in	   the	  mail	   volume	   combined	  with	   the	   licensing	   requirements	   do	   not	   leave	   enough	   space	   for	   the	   development	   of	  competition	  in	  the	  market.	  	  	  
6.	  Cost	  of	  universal	  service	  	  	  Our	  model	  does	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  evaluate	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  universal	  service	  as	  this	  would	  require	  the	  specification	  of	  a	  counter-­‐factual	  scenario	  without	  USO.	  	  However,	  the	  model	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Notice	  that	  this	  does	  not	  preclude	  that	  there	  are	  cheapest	  way	  to	  satisfy	  the	  coverage	  constraint.	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allows	   us	   to	   evaluate	   the	   joint	   impact	   of	   competition	   and	   e-­‐substitution	   on	   the	  incumbent’s	  cost	  of	  ODW	  and	  this	  cost	  is	  substantial	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  	  	  If	  the	  incumbent	  is	  the	  designated	  universal	  service	  provider	  and,	  as	  such,	  it	  must	  deliver	  mails	  five	  days	  a	  week,	   it	   cannot	   compensate	   decreasing	   volumes	   by	   a	   lower	   delivery	   frequency.	   It	   is	  therefore	   interesting	   to	   evaluate	   and	   to	   decompose	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   incumbent’s	  average	  cost	  of	  ODW.	  In	  the	  monopoly	  case,	  this	  cost	  is	  equal	  to	  0.141€;	  it	  increases	  to	  0.173€	  after	  entry	  and	  to	  0.214€	  if	  we	  combine	  entry	  and	  declining	  mail	  volumes.	  The	  total	   increase	   is	   thus	   equal	   to	   0.073€	   (+52%)	   which	   can	   be	   decomposed	   into	   an	  increased	  cost	  due	  to	  entry	  (0.032€,	  +23%)	  and	  e-­‐substitution	  (0.041€,	  +29%).	  It	  is	  then	  not	  a	  surprise	  that	  in	  a	  context	  of	  declining	  volumes,	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  USO	  is	  under	  question	  (Gautier	  and	  Poudou,	  2015).	  	  	  	   Figure	  2:	  Average	  cost	  of	  outdoor	  delivery	  work	  
	  Note:	  Incumbent's	  price	  in	  the	  monopoly	  case	  is	  0.5	  for	  bulk	  mail	  and	  0.72	  for	  standard	  mail;	  duopoly	  results	  and	  hypotheses	  are	  detailed	  in	  table	  4	  column	  2	  for	  current	  volume	  and	  in	  table	  5	  column	  2	  for	  reduced	  volume.	  	  	  	  
7.	  Concluding	  remarks	  	  




Monopoly	   Duopoly,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  current	  volume	   Duopoly,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  reduced	  volume	  
Incumbent	   Entrant	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Finally,	   we	   show	   that	   the	   combination	   of	   e-­‐substitution	   and	   entry	   increases	   the	  incumbent’s	   cost	  of	  ODW	  by	  52%	  because	  economies	  of	   scales	   in	   the	  delivery	  activity	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  exploited.	  	  This	  figure	  is	  a	  threat	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  universal	  service	  and	   it	   would	   be	   interesting	   to	   assess	   the	   impact	   of	  modifying	   the	   delivery	   frequency	  requirement	  (currently	  5	  deliveries	  per	  week)	  on	  both	  the	  incumbent’s	  cost	  of	  ODW	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  entry	  by	  the	  competitor,	  but	  this	  is	  left	  for	  future	  work.	  Such	  future	  work	  could	  also	  reflect	  the	  effects	  of	  different	  delivery	  frequencies	  and	  different	  numbers	  of	  locations	  served	  on	  demand	  for	  the	  entrant’s	  service.	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Appendix	  	   Table	  2:	  Hypotheses	  
Parameter	   Hypothesis	   Reference	  Postman	  salary	  per	  hour	  (euros)	   w=	  28.81	   Statbel	  Car	  cost	  per	  kilometer	  (euros)	   pcar=0.36	   Tera	  Consultants	  (2013)	  Length	  of	  the	  delivery	  round	  (km)	   Li=1.5li	   Jasinski	  and	  Steggles	  (1977)	  Speed	  (km/h)	   𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑!"# = 4  𝑖𝑓   !!!! < 0.02	  	   Roy	  (1999)	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑!"# = 4 + !"!.!"#   !!!! − 0.02   𝑖𝑓  0.02 < !!!! < 0.3	  	   	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑!"# = 35  𝑖𝑓   !!!! > 0.3	  	   	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑!"#$ = 4  𝑖𝑓   !!!! < 0.02	  	   	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑!"#$ = 4 + !!!.!"#   !!!! − 0.02 𝑖𝑓  0.02 < !!!! < 0.1	  	   	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑!"#$ = 15  𝑖𝑓   !!!! > 0.1	  	   	  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑!""# = 4	  	   	  Stop	  time	  (sec)	   𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒!"# = 12 + 𝑔! − 1 199 	  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒!"#$ = 20 + (𝑔! − 1) 219 	  𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒!""# = 40 + (𝑔! − 1) 409 	  
Roy	  (1999)	  
Delivery	  time	  (sec)	   delivery	  time=3	  	   Roy	  (1999)	  Maximum	  capacity	   qmax,foot=400	  qmax,bike=400	   Roy	  (1999)	  Loading	  time	  (sec)	   loading	  time=600	   Tera	  Consultants	  (2013)	  Delivery	  frequency	  (days/week)	   d=5	   WIK	  (2013)	  Items	  delivered	  per	  capita	  par	  year	   x=233	   WIK	  (2013)	  Items	  delivered	  per	  capita	  par	  day	   q=x/(52*d)	   	  Items	  delivered	  in	  the	  area	  par	  day	   Qi=q	  popi	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
